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THE MELTING OF PATENT LAW
Eben Moglen*
ABSTRACT
In this special comment, the author posits that the patent system as it stands is archaic
and oppressive, and has neither intellectual nor moral support. Having veered away
from its original goals, by virtue of the change in the technological and functional
basis of government, it instead serves as a justification for inequalities of wealth
distribution. The author argues that substantial reform is required that would shift the
balance in patent law from monopolistic greed to public interest, paving the way for
access to knowledge.
Legal thought is not mostly about creating better rules. Lawyers spend much
less of their time transforming the rules than they spend inventing new
explanations to justify the current effects of rules invented so long ago that
their original purposes are lost to memory. Changes in rules occur, mostly over
the objections of “respectable” legal thinkers, when the distance between current
conditions and obsolete rules becomes too great to bridge by explanatory
rhetoric, no matter how fictive or absurd.
At present, respectable legal opinion is reluctantly going through such a
process, coming to grips with the deterioration of intellectual and moral support
for the patent system. Late twentieth century patent apologetics took the
unprecedented and appalling position that human ingenuity would cease unless
all technical ideas, whether abstract or immediate, were turned into an absolute
monopoly through the metaphor of “intellectual property ownership”. The claim
that only ownership could stimulate creativity was obviously untrue, but on
the meretricious basis that “innovation” depended on the availability of long* Professor of Law and Legal History at Columbia Law School; Founder, Director-Counsel, and Chairman
of the Software Freedom Law Center; J.D., M.Phil in History (Hons.) ’85, Ph.D. ’93, Yale University.
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term statutory monopolies on ideas, the domain of the patent system extended
- first in the United States and then everywhere else American influence could
make itself felt - to software, business methods, pharmaceutical molecules, and
the genetic material embodied in natural objects.
This approach to justifying a current misdistribution of wealth bears no
relationship to the original goals of the patent system. Empowering its Congress
in the Constitution of 1787 to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”,1 the early United States
understood very differently the advantage of limited exclusivity for inventors.
That early American Republic had much empty land and few educated and
skilled inhabitants. Its economic future as a free, rather than slave, society
depended on skills drawn from the European population. Encouraging skilled
immigration was the only workable form of technology transfer for an eighteenth
century society. The United States Congress created patent law to help
Americans live by importing skilled brains - Scotland in the late eighteenth
century, for example, lived by exporting them.
So the original purpose lying behind American patent law was, in return
for brief periods of commercial exclusivity, to encourage skilled immigration
and ensure publicly-accessible documentation of the skills and inventions of
those immigrants. The method employed administratively in determining
whether to grant statutory monopolies, though widely copied by patent offices
around the world, is equally obsolete, representing the best of nineteenth century
bureaucratisation. The managerial technology of the nineteenth century had
little ability to make quantitative determinations about large-scale social
processes. With no ability to capture data about the market, no statistical sciences
with which to evaluate that data, and a shortage of trained staff that would
make the complaints of the contemporary Patent and Trademark Office seem
ridiculous, the patent system operated at the bleeding edge of administrative
complexity. Monopolies distributed for fixed terms, on a mere showing of
eligibility under loose criteria, were as much complexity an administrative system
could then possibly handle.
1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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In the course of the twentieth century, however, the technological and
functional basis of government changed. Administrative law came to assume a
governmental agency much more adept, capable, and accordingly accountable
for the effective attainment of public purposes. Although conservative thinkers
in the United States have tended to observe the expansion of the state’s
regulatory control at the expense of private aggregations of power, it would be
equally accurate to say that the terms on which administration was conducted
rendered the state radically more accountable, and therefore far more limited,
than it had been before.
The grant of a twenty-year statutory monopoly potentially involving
hundreds of billions of dollars in economic rents is a very substantial interference
with the free market. Until the recent partial nationalisations of financial
institutions, the largest single subsidies for the private aggregation of wealth in
the United States - far larger than any single military contract, resource lease,
or infrastructure project – were certain pharmaceutical patents, for example. In
every other context in which the federal administrative state in the US operates
to intervene massively in the private market, it does so under rules that require
some combination of open information collection, formal assessment of impact
and cost-benefit analysis, and immediate judicial review of the agency’s basis of
determination. But in patent law, these procedural fundamentals of twentieth
century administrative law are absent, replaced by the much more insensitive,
rudimentary, and therefore unrestrained processes of nineteenth century vested
rights creation.
This nineteenth century approach to administration correlates poorly with
the new-found justification for patent law: that it is the regulatory engine of
innovation. If patent law’s grant of statutory monopoly is actually the source of
innovation in the contemporary economy, one would expect government to
employ the expertise-based system for policy formation and protection of the
public interest that it finds necessary in relation to such other foundational
issues in industrial policy as environmental regulation, occupational safety, drug
and medical device regulation, etc. Instead, we approach this supposedly allsufficient engine of intellectual creativity with stunning unconcern for the details:
handing out monopolies of unvarying term without public comment or factfinding, without consideration of likely effect or impact on the public interest
and without any consideration of cost or its relation to benefit.
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The cost-benefit calculus of traditional patent law, in fact, assumes that
any patentable innovation is of infinite benefit - such that no formal consideration
of the cost involved in granting a monopoly need be undertaken at all. This is
a breathtakingly counter-factual assumption, one which the modern
administrative law makes in no other context.
Patent law thus presents, to the eye of the historian, characteristics of a
legal regime in senescence. Its original purposes having sunk, it is presently
supported by a justificatory narrative constructed after the fact, inconsistently
cobbled together with outmoded procedural institutions at odds with the current
state of administrative practice and contemporary political economy. For
government to hand out generation-long market monopolies in key industries
without cost-benefit analysis or an opportunity for public comment would
ordinarily be stigmatised as industrial policy run amok, if it weren’t assumed to
be the result of “crony capitalism” or outright corruption. Those who are enabled
to acquire vested rights on an immense scale at comparatively insignificant cost
can be expected to praise the system highly and resist every form of fundamental
change, but only a biased eye could fail to observe the radical distance between
rhetoric and reality.
Nor is the moral case for patent law any more robust. Patent disclosures
were a crucial form of technological literature in the eighteenth century, when
even the most advanced societies lacked comprehensive detailed documentation
of almost all their basic industrial processes, and learning by any means other
than direct contact with skilled artisans was impossible. The development of
an industry like contemporary pharmaceutical manufacturing - dependent on
an immense socialised research system in the United States National Institutes
of Health but claiming monopoly property rights in technical outcomes based
on that research - was not an imaginable outcome under traditional patent law,
because such a socialised research infrastructure was unimaginable. Instead,
patent law was assumed to be a mechanism substituting, in default of better
choices in an immeasurably poorer society, for direct governmental subsidisation
of research. Yet modern pharma not only exists by monopolising the benefits of
socialised research, but grows fat on profits earned by charging more for the
products of that research than the richest society in the world can afford to pay
for access to those products for all its citizens. The industry goes further under
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conditions of globalisation, by charging more than other societies can afford to
pay as well, for drugs resulting from basic biomedical research done by the
socialised U.S. research system, and whose further development was then fully
funded by profitable sale back to U.S. citizens and their insurers. Everywhere,
in order to pay the rents demanded by “property”, societies are forced to reduce
other aspects of health care delivery, and vulnerable human beings die.
The United States in its industrial period of development, since roughly
1815, has been particularly inclined in its legal theory towards theories of property.
Innovation in technology, creativity in art, business reputation, algorithms,
musical phrases, rights to receive speculative future profits of businesses, personal
fame, the medical employment of particular molecules, methods of conducting
businesses, and the location in human chromosomes of genes with occasional
medically-significant adverse mutations have all been conceived of as property,
without any apparent awareness of artifice. With the conception of these
intangibles as property comes a presumption of the right to exclude. But exclusion
when applied to knowledge is enforced ignorance, which is the immediate
precursor of hereditary social injustice. The right to exclude from knowledge is
never conceived of by adherents as the purpose of the “intellectual property
system.” But it is, in the long run, the system’s most deplorable ingredient.
All societies, since the beginning of human civilization, have wasted almost
all the human brains they possessed. We must recognise, whenever we trouble
ourselves to consider, that nearly none of the Einsteins who ever existed were
permitted to learn physics, that but few of all our Ramanujans were allowed
access to mathematics. The human race has never succeeded in freeing every
brain to learn. All its other difficulties - technical, social and spiritual - are made
profoundly worse by this consistent failure. But within the next two generations
it will become possible to allow all human beings, everywhere, access to all the
combined intellectual and cultural attainments of humankind. Our network of
networks contains digital representations of everything we know and know
how to do. Every book, film, instructional video, text, or record of recent
experience can be searched for and delivered to instruments that cost very little
and fit in a child’s pocket. A society in which today even the poorest of the
urban poor can possess a mobile phone can become tomorrow a society in
which anyone can learn anything. The primary obstacles are the institutions
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which render knowledge “property”, and create therewith an artificial
entitlement to exclude.
So the law of the past must soon come to the end of senescence, and
experience both death and transfiguration. Despite the inevitable continuance
to the end of “respectable” opinion, the distance between explanatory rhetoric
and reality has grown too wide, and the immediate power of social need is
much too great to permit the endurance of the system we have known. This
historical process, history shows, will remain invisible to the established oracles
and their students until the very last moment, because training in the reigning
justification narrative tends to bias the lawyer’s cognitive awareness of the deeply
conflicting reality.
What is presently talked of as “reform” is merely the rearrangement of
furniture. Substantive reform, that would strengthen the system’s social benefits
without entirely reworking the existing distribution of rights, is still possible.
Rather than nineteenth century patent process, we need a flexible system that
establishes the economic value of innovation and provides for the realisation of
fair commercial returns while protecting the rights of researchers, students and
non-profit innovators. Monopolies should be granted only within commercial
fields of use and for terms limited to the necessary period of cost recoupment.
Systems of sharing knowledge to enhance innovation through commons rather
than exclusive ownership, such as free software licensing and Creative Commons
culture, should be equally protected and fostered by legal rules and governmental
administrative practice as proprietary production. Principles of public access,
cost-benefit analysis, and judicial review to protect the public interest should
be scrupulously honoured in every legal setting.
Failure of reform will not leave the patent system undisturbed. It will merely
continue the process of detaching existing practice from surrounding reality.
The parties who grow rich through the existing system will grow richer, and
they will continue to deny respectability to any theoretical position unfavourable
to their interests. But the demand for equal access to learning is a demand
founded in the most basic principles of human justice. It will not be ultimately
denied. And what has stood as a barrier in its path will most likely be swept
away.

